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A NEW CAREMARK ERA:  
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
ROY SHAPIRA* 
ABSTRACT 
What role does corporate law play in holding directors accountable for 
compliance failures? Until recently, the answer has been “very little.” The 
prevalent standard for director oversight duties (Caremark duties) was set 
high, effectively demanding that plaintiffs show scienter without having 
access to discovery. As a result, derivative actions over directors’ failure of 
oversight were routinely dismissed at the pleading stage, and many 
commentators considered Caremark duties largely irrelevant. Yet starting 
in June 2019, a string of successful Caremark cases have signaled a new 
era of enhanced oversight duties. This Article contributes to our 
understanding of the new Caremark era along three dimensions. First, the 
Article delineates the contours of the shift in Delaware courts’ approach to 
oversight duties. The courts now increasingly apply the “mission critical 
compliance” exception to justify enhanced duties, and lower the threshold 
for receiving information in order to investigate potential failure-of-
oversight claims. Second, the Article identifies the drivers of this “new 
Caremark era,” with special emphasis on the role of a seemingly disparate 
development in shareholders’ right to information from the company. 
Shareholders now enjoy much better pre-filing discovery powers, which 
they can utilize to plead with particularity facts about how the board never 
even discussed a critical compliance issue, or how they knew about critical 
problems but chose to ignore them. Armed with these newfound pre-filing 
investigatory tools, shareholders can overcome what once seemed 
insuperable pleading hurdles. Finally, the Article evaluates the desirability 
of the new Caremark era, spotlighting its likely positive effects on 
information flows inside companies and the ability of the market to 
discipline corporate misbehavior (better reputational discipline), as well as 
the ways in which it nicely compensates for the blind spots of other 
enforcement mechanisms.  
 
* Harry Radzyner Law School, IDC. I thank Elizabeth Pollman, Amanda Rose, Holger 
Spamann, Andrew Tuch, and participants at The Public Corporations at a Crossroads and The European 
Law and Economic Association conferences for helpful comments on previous drafts. I also thank 
several practicing lawyers and journalists for helpful conversations on the real-world consequences of 
oversight liability litigation, most notably Roger Cooper, Joel Friedlander, Jane Goldstein, Tanya 
Pampalona, Manfred Redfeld, and Dean Starkman.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Compliance has become a key corporate governance issue across the 
globe.1 Companies pour hundreds of billions of dollars into internal 
compliance programs meant to prevent and detect wrongdoing by their 
employees.2 Regulators are constantly attempting to gauge the effectiveness 
 
1. Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compliance, 103 MINN. L. REV. 
2135, 2146 (2019); Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Organic Corporate Governance, 59 B.C. L. 
REV. 21, 44–45 (2018) (compiling references). “Compliance” here is defined as the set of internal 
processes firms employ in order to ensure that their behavior falls in line with applicable laws. See Sean 
J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2082 
(2016). Recently there have been calls to broaden the scope so that these internal processes would also 
ensure meeting broader societal expectations. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Kirby M. Smith & Reilly S. 
Steel, Caremark and ESG, Perfect Together: A Practical Approach to Implementing an Integrated, 
Efficient, and Effective Caremark and EESG Strategy, 106 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://sch 
olarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3198&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma. 
cc/F6Y2-6PR8].  
2. See Eugene Soltes, Evaluating the Effectiveness of Corporate Compliance Programs: 












of such internal compliance programs. Yet until recently, corporate law 
played a seemingly very limited role. The prevalent standard for director 
oversight duties (Caremark duties3) was set high, effectively demanding 
that plaintiffs show scienter without having access to discovery. As a result, 
derivative actions over directors’ failure of oversight were routinely 
dismissed at the pleading stage, and many commentators considered 
Caremark duties largely irrelevant.  
Against this background, it was noteworthy when, within thirteen 
months in 2019–2020, four Caremark claims succeeded in surviving the 
motion to dismiss (Marchand, Clovis, Hughes, and Chou). Practitioners 
immediately took notice, and started debating the meaning of the string of 
successful cases. Does it signify a meaningful trend of a “stricter Caremark 
era,”4 or is it merely a rare coincidence of cases with extremely egregious 
facts?5 And if there is, indeed, a resurgence in director oversight duties, why 
now? What changed around 2019 that sparked the resurgence?  
The answers, this Article suggests, are (1) “yes,” and (2) “section 220.” 
Yes, there is a trend of revamped director oversight duties. And this trend is 
here to stay, partly because it is driven by a seemingly disparate 
development in shareholders’ rights to information from the company, 
nestled in D.G.C.L. § 220.6 
Section 220 grants shareholders a qualified right to inspect the 
company’s books and records. In recent years Delaware courts have 
liberalized their interpretation of section 220 requirements: both in terms of 
whether to provide internal documents (the “proper purpose” requirement), 
and in terms of what internal documents to provide (the “permissible scope” 
requirement). The courts now order provision of not just formal documents 
such as board minutes, but also informal electronic communications such as 
private emails or LinkedIn messages between directors. Armed with such 
newfound pre-filing discovery powers, shareholders and their attorneys can 
use the internal documents to plead with particularity facts that implicate 
directors’ mental state and awareness, thereby overcoming the once-
insuperable Caremark pleading hurdle. Plaintiffs can now more easily show 
that the board never even discussed a critical compliance issue, or knew 
about critical problems but chose to ignore them.  
Indeed, section 220 actions—that is, litigation over what documents 
shareholders can get in order to investigate potential failure of oversight—
should be considered themselves a part of the new Caremark era. Within 
 
3. Named after one of Delaware’s most iconic cases. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative 
Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), adopted by Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 365 (Del. 2006). 
4. Infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
5. Infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
6. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2021). 











the past year, plaintiffs have succeeded in getting internal documents, 
including sometimes emails, to investigate failures of oversight on the part 
of Facebook’s directors in the Cambridge Analytica scandal, or 
AmerisourceBergen’s directors in the opioid crisis, to name two examples. 
In other words, the trend is bigger than the Marchand-Clovis-Hughes-Chou 
quadfecta.  
What changed is therefore not necessarily the standard for oversight 
liability, which is still a high bar,7 but rather shareholders’ ability to 
establish the facts and hold directors accountable. In a separate project I 
show how the expansion of section 220 has revamped judicial oversight of 
deal negotiations;8 here I focus on how it has revamped director oversight 
duties as well. To be sure, there exist other factors contributing to the new 
Caremark era, beyond the increased emphasis on pre-filing investigations. 
Notably, Delaware courts have been carving a constantly-growing 
exception to the deferential standard, in the form of “mission critical 
compliance”: in situations where meeting certain regulatory demands is 
critical to the firm’s success, directors should be especially alert to yellow 
and red flags, and proactively monitor compliance. The combination of the 
courts’ increased willingness to scrutinize directors’ conduct in this context 
and plaintiffs’ increased ability to document directors’ conduct is likely to 
continue generating successful Caremark claims going forward.  
Yet it is one thing to say that plaintiffs are now more likely to succeed in 
failure-of-oversight claims, and another to say that the new turn in 
Caremark litigation is desirable from a societal perspective. For one, the 
expansion of pre-filing discovery comes with its own set of costs, such as 
potentially bringing back the dreaded fishing expeditions through the 
backdoor.9 And, critics may claim, thus far it has produced no meaningful 
benefits: success in section 220 actions or the motion to dismiss does not 
mean that these cases will ultimately be decided in favor of the plaintiffs. 
We therefore cannot conclude that the new Caremark era will generate more 
compensation for shareholders or better deterrence, the argument goes. In 
fact, such an objection misconstrues how Delaware corporate law works 
(deters). In corporate law, in general, corporate decision-makers practically 
 
7. For a recent iteration of the high standard, namely, particularized allegations of bad faith, see 
Richardson v. Clark, C.A. No. 2019-1015-SG (Del. Ch., Dec. 31, 2020) (clarifying that when directors 
truly try to remedy a compliance problem but fail, it would not constitute a breach of their Caremark 
duty). 
8. Roy Shapira, Corporate Law, Retooled: How Books and Records Revamped Judicial 
Oversight, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=3600935 [https://perma.cc/G5YM-M3A5]. 
9. “Fishing expedition” here denotes the concern that parties may bombard each other with 
requests to find information that may or may not exist, needlessly raising the costs of litigation in the 













never pay out of pocket for their misbehavior.10 Yet deterrence cannot be 
measured solely on the basis of sanctions imposed in verdicts coming after 
a full trial.  
Corporate law’s impact on oversight rather comes from paying 
settlements ex post and, pertinently, planning how to avoid the risks and 
costs of litigation ex ante. Part of the law’s effect on behavior comes from 
the memos that legal advisors send their clients, explaining how they should 
behave going forward. As this Article details, the new Caremark cases 
created a wave of law firm memos calling on boards to place compliance 
issues on the agenda and make sure deliberations are being properly 
recorded. Another part of the law’s effect on behavior comes from imposing 
(uninsurable) non-legal costs, such as emotional costs (stress, 
embarrassment) and reputational costs (having details about your 
misbehavior dug out and made public for all other market participants to 
see). This Article illustrates how the expansion of section 220 has 
dramatically increased these non-legal costs for failure of oversight, thereby 
ramping up deterrence. In all, while it is still too early to empirically assess 
the costs and benefits of the new mode of Caremark litigation, this Article 
provides several indications that suggest it will, indeed, prove desirable.  
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I sets the stage by delineating 
the ebbs and flows of director oversight standards over the years, 
culminating in their recent resurgence. Part II explains why two important 
new developments in Delaware law, namely, director oversight duties and 
shareholder information rights, are intertwined. The resurgence of 
inspection rights led to a resurgence of oversight duties. Part III evaluates 
some of the consequences of the section 220 turn in Caremark litigation, 
such as an increased emphasis on documentation and upward flows of 
information inside organizations. I then conclude by extrapolating lessons 
from the recent development in director oversight duties to offer big-picture 
observations on how Delaware corporate law works when it is at its best. 
I. NEW TRENDS IN OVERSIGHT LIABILITY 
The 1996 Caremark decision reinvented director oversight duties.11 Prior 
to Caremark, directors’ duties were merely reactive: as long as the 
 
10. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.  
11. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). The case revolved 
around illegal kickbacks to physicians, which ended up costing the company around $250 million in 
civil fines. Id. at 960–61. On the iconic stature of Caremark as one of the most important corporate 
governance decisions, see Todd Haugh, Caremark’s Behavioral Legacy, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 611, 612 
(2018) (“[F]ew cases loom larger in the realm of corporate governance.”). There exists a voluminous 
literature on the Caremark decision and its aftermath. I provide here only a bare bones summary, as 
context for the Article’s main claims regarding the 2019–2020 developments in oversight liability. 











company’s employees did not flag a problem, directors could assume 
everything was fine.12 Caremark institutes an affirmative duty to be 
proactive: directors have to install a system that monitors compliance issues 
and reports them back. Even Caremark’s critics agree that, at a minimum, 
it raised awareness and increased the urgency of compliance issues in 
boardrooms.13  
Yet many legal scholars claim that Caremark did little more than raise 
attention, ultimately failing to bring about a substantive improvement in 
board oversight.14 The oft-mentioned culprit is the very high threshold for 
plaintiffs to prove failure of oversight. Plaintiffs have to show bad faith, 
namely, that the directors consciously disregarded their duties.15 Practically 
speaking, such a threshold translated to a high likelihood of early dismissals 
of Caremark claims.16 Plaintiffs had a very hard time convincing the courts 
that demand on the board should be excused because the board faces a 
substantial likelihood of personal liability:17 in order to do so, they had to 
plead particularized facts about directors’ mental state and awareness,18 
which are hard to come by without access to discovery. In other words, 
without access to internal documents, it is hard to show what directors knew 
about the problem, when they knew it, and whether they could have done 
more to stop it.  
 
12. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). The case revolved around 
criminal price-fixing.  
13. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary, Caremark and Compliance: A Twenty-Year 
Lookback, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 727, 729 (2018); Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of 
Corporate Governance, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 47 (2015) (noting Caremark helped spur the rise of the 
multi-billion compliance industry as we have come to know it); Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing 
Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 967 n.117 (2009).  
14. See, e.g., Anne Tucker Nees, Who’s the Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability Within the 
Corporate Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 215–16 (2010); Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s 
Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15 (2013). 
15. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006); see also Jennifer Arlen, The Story of 
Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone: Directors’ Evolving Duty to Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW 
STORIES 323, 326 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009). Indeed, the Caremark decision itself famously 
acknowledges that a “Caremark” claim is one of the most difficult for plaintiffs to win. Caremark, 698 
A.2d at 967, 971.  
16. See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 
2032 (2019); see also Paul E. McGreal, Caremark in the Arc of Compliance History, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 
647, 676 n.238 (2018) (compiling references); Ezra Wasserman Mitchell, Caremark’s Hidden Promise, 
51 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 239, 241–42 (2018) (same). 
17. To bring a derivative claim, the plaintiff first has to make a demand on the company’s board 
to pursue that claim. To survive the demand-requirement stage, plaintiffs practically need to convince 
the courts that a demand is futile because the company’s board cannot be trusted to make the right 
decision—because directors themselves face a significant threat of personal liability, for example. 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811–12 (Del. 1984), overruled in part by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 
244, 253 (Del. 2000); Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 930 (Del. 1993). 
18. Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 141–43 (Del. 2008); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative 












The parade of early dismissals of Caremark claims led to a parade of law 
review articles bemoaning Caremark’s lack of bite.19 Scholars criticized 
Caremark for practically insulating boards from oversight liability, being 
“irrelevant,”20 a “toothless tiger,”21 and “an empty triumph of form over 
substance.”22  
Against this background, it was notable when, in June 2019, Delaware’s 
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of the Blue Bell 
case, Marchand v. Barnhill.23 Marchand revolved around a food safety 
crisis: Blue Bell, one of the largest ice-cream manufacturers in the U.S., had 
a line of ice-cream products contaminated with listeria, causing three deaths 
and massive recalls.24 Shareholders brought a claim of failure of oversight, 
which the Chancery routinely dismissed for not being able to link the bad 
outcomes at the company level to bad intentions on the directors’ part. Yet 
the Delaware Supreme Court had a different reading: for then-Chief Justice 
Strine, the fact that the plaintiffs showed that the board of a food-
manufacturing company never even discussed food safety issues indicated 
a possible utter failure of compliance,25 thereby justifying denying the 
motion to dismiss.26  
Coming on the heels of Marchand was the October 2019 Clovis case,27 
involving a pharmaceutical company whose fate rested on the successful 
development of a promising drug for lung cancer therapy. When the drug’s 
trial did not go as hoped, the company failed to accurately report to the 
regulator and the market the true efficacy of the drug. The Court denied the 
company’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that for a “monoline” company 
 
19. See, e.g., Megan W. Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement of Corporate Officers’ Duties, 48 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 271, 307 (2014) (compiling references); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, 
Reconsidering Board Oversight Duties After the Financial Crisis, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 859 (arguing 
board monitoring duties should be expanded); Eric J. Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor: A 
Critical Assessment of the Delaware Doctrine, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209 (2011). But see Edward B. 
Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing 
Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1675–76 (2001) (arguing that the doctrine’s hands-off approach 
is desirable because it facilitates self-governing); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, 
The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559 (2008). 
20. Bullard, supra note 14, at 44. 
21. Nees, supra note 14, at 216. 
22. Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, In re Caremark: Good Intentions, Unintended 
Consequences, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691, 692 (2004); see also McGreal, supra note 16, at 648 
(arguing that Caremark’s development stalled, leaving it a “largely symbolic” duty). 
23. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019). 
24. Id. at 812–13, 822. 
25. Whether the board failed to implement a monitoring and reporting system is the first prong 
of the Caremark inquiry. The second is whether the board consciously ignored damning information 
that such a monitoring system, once implemented, generated. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 
2006).  
26. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 824. 
27. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 1, 2019). 











(similarly to Blue Bell) operating in a “highly regulated industry,”28 meeting 
FDA protocols is “mission critical,” which calls for heightened oversight 
scrutiny.29 Indications of problems in that context thus count as 
quintessential red flags that directors should never have ignored.30  
In April 2020 came yet another successful Caremark case, Hughes v. 
Hu.31 There, an auto parts company had persistently struggled to meet the 
legal requirements for financial reporting and related-party transactions, and 
the shareholder plaintiff sought damages from directors and officers for 
their pervasive oversight failures.32 The court denied the motion to dismiss, 
reasoning that even though the company “had the trappings of oversight,”33 
the mere existence of audit committees and departments charged with 
compliance is not enough to rebut a Caremark claim, when evidence 
indicates that these institutions met only sporadically and consistently 
ignored clear indications of irregularities.34  
This trifecta of successful Caremark cases quickly attracted the attention 
of practitioners and academics alike. Law firms sent memos to their clients, 
warning them of a potential “stricter Caremark era” that is upon us.35 
Scholars who were bemoaning Caremark’s lack of bite now edited their 
papers to describe the new development as potentially signifying a desirable 
change of direction.36 But while commentators agreed that these new 
Caremark cases are worthy of attention, they seemingly could not agree on 
whether the cases represent a meaningful trend or not. Some quipped that 
 
28. Id. at *1. 
29. Id. at *12–13. The emphasis on “mission critical compliance” follows the lead of Marchand, 
212 A.3d at 822.  
30. Clovis, 2019 WL 4850188, at *2. In other words, while the Marchand court emphasized 
Caremark’s first prong, the Clovis court emphasized Caremark’s second prong.  
31. Hughes v. Hu, No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 WL 1987029 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020).  
32. Id. at *1. 
33. Id. at *16. 
34. Id. at *14–17. 
35. Francis Pileggi, Directors May Face Oversight Liability for Not Properly Monitoring Key 
Drug’s Clinical Trial, DEL. CORP. & COM. LITIG. BLOG (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.delawarelitigation. 
com/2019/10/articles/chancery-court-updates/directors-may-face-oversight-liability-for-not-properly-
monitoring-key-drugs-clinical-trial/ [https://perma.cc/UET8-ZWTY]; see also Roger Cooper, Jared 
Gerber, Vanessa Richardson & David Wagner, Cleary Gottlieb Offers 2019 Mid-Year Developments in 
Securities and M&A Litigation, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Aug. 27, 2019), https://clsbluesky.law.colu 
mbia.edu/2019/08/27/cleary-gottlieb-offers-2019-mid-year-developments-in-securities-and-ma-litigati 
on/ [https://perma.cc/7DUR-DH6D] (treating Marchand as a reminder that Caremark claims “still have 
teeth,” after all). For more on practitioners’ reactions to the new Caremark cases see Shapira, supra note 
8 (manuscript at 27 n.141) (compiling examples); Robert C. Bird, Caremark Compliance for the Next 
Twenty-Five Years, 58 AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstr 
act_id=3566279 [https://perma.cc/9ZZW-GHF4] (analyzing more systematically thirty such 
memorandums).  
36. See John Armour, Jeffrey Gordon & Geeyoung Min, Taking Compliance Seriously, 37 YALE 












“once is a happenstance, two is a coincidence, and three is enemy action,”37 
while others suggested that three is not a trend,38 choosing to highlight 
instead the egregious circumstances in these cases that make them less 
applicable going forward.  
While the debate was still raging, the trifecta turned into a quadfecta. In 
August 2020, another Caremark claim survived the motion to dismiss, in 
Teamsters Local 443 v. Chou.39 There, the AmerisourceBergen Company 
(ABC) had one of its subsidiaries embroiled in a criminal investigation into 
cancer drug repackaging. The subsidiary was pooling overfills from 
oncology vials, which were not intended for patient use, and repackaging 
them into syringes that they then sold and distributed. This behavior violated 
multiple laws and regulations, eventually costing ABC hundreds of millions 
in criminal and civil fines. The court found pleading-stage indications for 
several red flags that were ignored by ABC’s directors: an outside law firm 
flagged a lack of monitoring of the particular subsidiary in question, the 
Subsidiary’s former COO filed a qui tam action invoking the violations in 
question, and the DOJ issued a subpoena regarding the matter.40 Throughout 
the opinion, the court seemingly departs from the conventional 
understanding of Caremark, according to which some compliance is enough 
compliance.41 Not anymore, apparently: the fact that the board hired an 
outside law firm to flag areas of weaknesses, and then heard reports from 
the chief compliance officer about efforts to ramp up compliance in these 
areas, is not enough, the court insisted, given that there is no documentation 
of the board demanding updates and progress reports.42 In other words, it is 
not enough to make sure that risks are disclosed to the board; the board has 
to follow up and attempt to rectify these risks. The fact that the board heard 
 
37. Professor Bainbridge, channeling his inner Ian Fleming. Stephen Bainbridge, Is Caremark 
Still the Hardest Claim for Plaintiffs to Win in Corporate Law?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (May 3, 
2020), https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2020/05/is-caremark-still-the-ha 
rdest-claim-for-plaintiffs-to-win-in-corporate-law.html [https://perma.cc/5DSD-CT22].  
38. Nicholas D. Mozal & David A. Seal, Three Is Not a Trend: Another Caremark Claim Survives 
a Motion to Dismiss, But Does Not Reflect a Change In The Law, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (May 27, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/27/three-is-not-a-trend-anothe 
r-caremark-claim-survives-a-motion-to-dismiss-but-does-not-reflect-a-change-in-the-law/ [https://perm 
a.cc/35WJ-VRHU]; see also Meredith Kotler, Pamela Marcogliese & Marques Tracy, Recent Delaware 
Court of Chancery Decision Sustains Another Caremark Claim at the Pleading Stage, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 25, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/25/recent-delaware-
court-of-chancery-decision-sustains-another-caremark-claim-at-the-pleading-stage/ [https://perma.cc/ 
W9SR-4MGM] (“It remains unlikely that these recent decisions signal some change in the law, but 
rather reflect allegations of unique or extreme examples of certain corporate behavior.”). 
39. Teamsters Loc. 443 Health Servs. & Ins. Plan v. Chou, No. 2019-0816-SG, 2020 WL 
5028065 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2020). 
40. Id. at *19–24. 
41. See Langevoort, supra note 13, at 729–30 (suggesting Caremark demands “almost nothing 
beyond asking that some compliance system exists”).  
42. Chou, 2020 WL 5028065, at *10.  











recommendations on how to deal with the qui tam suit was also deemed not 
enough, given that there is no indication that they did something about the 
underlying issue. And the fact that board minutes did not contain a 
discussion of the DOJ subpoena (even though the board signed a Form 10-
K disclosure recognizing the subpoena) is held against them as an indication 
of, again, not doing enough.43  
Importantly, The Chou court reiterates and further extends the basis for 
the previous three successful cases. Following Marchand and Clovis, Chou 
implies an enhanced oversight duty for “mission critical” risks. But recall 
that Marchand and Clovis referred to “mission critical compliance” in the 
context of monoline companies, whose fate rests on meeting the regulatory 
requirements for a single product. The Chou court extends the application 
of such enhanced oversight duties to the context of a giant drug company, 
for violations that occur in one of its many subsidiaries, and involve only a 
tiny fraction of the company’s overall revenues ($14 million).44 Following 
Chou, one could provocatively maintain that everything is regulatory 
mission critical these days.45  
And like Hughes, Chou uses any document that was not produced by the 
defendants against them.46 If in the past one could claim that lack of 
documentation evidences that directors were not aware of the problem (and 
so no pleading-stage indication of bad faith exists), after Chou it becomes 
clear that lack of documentation can evidence lack of needed follow-ups 
and actions on part of the board to remedy potential oversight issues. Chou 
further implies that directors would be held aware of any piece of 
information included in company’s disclosures and documents that they 
execute (such as Form 10-K).47  
In a little over a year, then, four Caremark claims survived the motion to 
dismiss. Do these cases represent a meaningful shift in oversight liability, 
or are they merely a coincidence of several cases with rare circumstances? 
And if we are indeed witnessing a new trend, why now? What changed 
around 2019 that facilitated the purported change in oversight liability?  
II. CAUSES: THE RISE OF SHAREHOLDER INSPECTION RIGHTS 
My answer to the above-mentioned question is: yes, there is a systematic 
change in failure-of-oversight litigation. A new Caremark era. And the main 
 
43. Id. at *24. 
44. Id. at *5.  
45. Indeed, we will later see that law firms are now advising their clients that the revamped 
Caremark duties may apply also to how the board handles cybersecurity risks or the challenges that 
come with COVID-19. See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
46. Chou, 2020 WL 5028065, at *2.  












reason I think that this trend is here to stay is that it is connected to and 
driven by a seemingly disparate development in shareholders’ right to 
information from the company. Success in Caremark litigation has always 
hinged on plaintiffs’ ability to conduct thorough pre-filing investigations, 
so as to be able to link the directors to the trauma that the company suffered. 
One way for shareholders to investigate potential failures of oversight is to 
utilize their right, nestled in D.G.C.L. § 220, to inspect the company’s 
“books and records.”48 Shareholders’ inspection rights include internal 
company documents such as board materials and intra-company 
communications.49 And in recent years, the courts have liberalized their 
interpretation of section 220, now allowing shareholders to gain access to 
more internal documents, including even informal electronic 
communications via emails and private LinkedIn messages.50 Armed with 
this increasingly potent investigatory tool, shareholders can now plead with 
particularity facts indicating that red flags were flown in the directors’ faces, 
thereby surviving the once-insuperable Caremark pleading hurdle.  
This Part fleshes out the link between the two seemingly disparate 
developments in inspection rights and oversight liability. Section A explains 
why shareholder litigation in general has long put a premium on pre-filing 
investigations. Section B applies the general argument to the specific 
failure-of-oversight context, showing how Caremark claims that succeed 
tend to be those relying heavily on evidence extracted from prior section 
220 requests. Section C details the recent liberalization of section 220 
requirements, as it pertains to director oversight duties. Section D then 
acknowledges that not everything is related to section 220, delineating other 
(non-exclusive) factors that contribute to the new Caremark era. 
A. Corporate Law Puts a Premium on Pre-Filing Investigations  
A fundamental challenge in any litigation is how to separate the 
meritorious from the meritless claims. More accurately, the challenge is 
when to do the screening. Screening cases early reduces the “direct costs” 
of the process (and the chilling effects that come with them), as in saving 
the costs of going through discovery and trial.51 At the same time, screening 
early increases the “error costs”: if you set the pleading bar high (as in 
requiring a showing of scienter), screening early may mean dismissing too 
many meritorious claims; if you set the bar low, screening early may mean 
 
48. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2021). 
49. Id.  
50. E.g., KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Techs. Inc., 203 A.3d 738 (Del. 2019). 
51. For a concise summary of economic analysis of civil procedure, see Daniel Klerman, The 
Economics of Civil Procedure, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 353 (2015).  











spending too many resources on meritless claims. In American shareholder 
litigation (both in federal and in state courts), the screening is done early 
and aggressively, prior to discovery.52 The motion to dismiss has become 
the main event: most shareholder litigation cases face one, and many such 
motions succeed.53  
Opting for early screening with a high pleading bar can be justified by 
pointing to two key differences between shareholder litigation and other 
types of litigation: asymmetries in discovery costs and agency problems. 
Unlike in other types of litigation, in shareholder litigation the costs of 
discovery fall mainly on one side, namely, the defendants’ side.54 And 
because shareholder litigation is usually representative litigation (derivative 
or class actions), there are also more severe agency problems: the 
representative may conduct litigation in ways that impose costs rather than 
benefits on the other, passive shareholders.55 As a result, shareholder 
litigation is more susceptible to strike suits and quick settlements that 
benefit no one but the attorneys.56 In other words, the choice of early 
screening with a high pleading bar is meant to combat the worry that 
plaintiff attorneys will rush to file suits without investigating the merits and 
use the discovery costs as leverage to extract quick rents from defendants.57  
At the same time, such early screening increases the “false negative” 
errors of dismissing meritorious claims, in a context where the costs of false 
negatives are huge: breaches of duties in corporate and securities laws can 
cause potential harms in the billions of dollars.58 A key challenge for courts 
is therefore how not to overscreen, that is, how to maintain deterrence. 
Delaware courts have traditionally answered the early screening challenge 
with a combination of (1) assuring the availability of high-quality 
information even at an early stage, and (2) having expert judges who could 
evaluate the strength of cases based on partial information.59  
 
52. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Importance of Being Dismissive: 
The Efficiency Role of Pleading Stage Evaluation of Shareholder Litigation, 42 J. CORP. L. 597, 600 
(2017). 
53. Cf. Stephen J. Choi & A. C. Pritchard, The Supreme Court’s Impact on Securities Class 
Actions: An Empirical Assessment of Tellabs, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 850, 851 (2012) (on shareholder 
securities litigation); Jessica Erickson, The Lost Lessons of Shareholder Derivative Suits, 77 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1131 (2020) (on shareholder derivative actions). 
54. See Shapira, supra note 8 (manuscript at 10); Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 52, at 602. 
55. Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 52, at 605. 
56. Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1054 (Del. Ch. 1996).  
57. Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder Litigation, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 75, 93 (2008). For Delaware courts’ criticism of “fast filers,” see In re Cox 
Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 608 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 
990 A.2d 940, 959–60 (Del. Ch. 2010); John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s 
Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1368 (2012) (compiling examples). 
58. Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 713 (1996) (asserting costs of fraud outweigh costs of litigation in our context). 












Nowhere is this shareholder litigation dynamic—trying to combat fast-
filers while assuring availability of high-quality information—more 
pronounced than in Caremark litigation. Delaware courts have long 
expressed their disdain for those who hasten to file a complaint shortly after 
a regulator announces an enforcement action against the company, without 
bothering to properly investigate first.60 Indeed, one relatively unnoticed 
aspect of the otherwise endlessly analyzed Caremark opinion is that 
Chancellor Allen struck down the proposed attorney fee as too high. Allen 
reasoned that the attorney merely piggybacked on prior regulatory 
enforcement actions, without adding much to the preexisting mix of 
information or remedies.61 
Concomitantly, the courts have long admonished plaintiffs to use all the 
tools at hand to investigate before filing a Caremark claim, and in particular 
to utilize their rights to inspect the company’s books and records under 
section 220.62 The Court of Chancery went as far as adopting a presumption 
of inadequate representation for those who file Caremark claims without 
utilizing section 220 first.63 While Delaware’s Supreme Court has thus far 
refused to adopt such a sweeping approach,64 it has nevertheless recognized 
the problem, and offered a plethora of more nuanced approaches.65 In all, 
the courts seem to agree that in failure-of-oversight claims, rushing to file 
makes little sense: the claim is about something that has already happened, 
and there is a real need to investigate thoroughly, as the claim invokes 
scienter.66  
The ebbs and flows of oversight cases should therefore be viewed (also) 
through the lens of Delaware courts trying to combat file-first-investigate-
 
60. Armour, Black & Cheffins, supra note 57, at 1375. 
61. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 972 (Del. Ch. 1996). Perhaps 
nowhere is this criticism more pronounced than in the Citigroup case, where the court denounced the 
mode of filing Caremark claims based on “general ipse dixit syllogisms” and the hope that “the Court 
[would] accept the conclusion that since the Company suffered large losses, and since a properly 
functioning risk management system would have avoided such losses, the directors must have breached 
their fiduciary duties in allowing such losses.” In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 
106, 128–29 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
62. See Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 143–44 (Del. 2008). 
63. La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 335–36 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Pyott I); 
South v. Baker, 62 A.3d 1, 22–24 (Del. Ch. 2012); Cal. State Tchrs.’ Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, 179 A.3d 824, 
853 (Del. 2018). To be sure, a presumption of inadequacy is just that: a presumption. It can be rebutted, 
for example, if the plaintiff shows that she did conduct thorough pre-filing investigations, albeit by 
means other than section 220. 
64. Pyott v. La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 74 A.3d 612 (Del. 2013) (Pyott II); cf. King v. 
VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 12 A.3d 1140, 1150–52 (Del. 2011). 
65. Such as denying lead plaintiff status, limiting the ability of the fast filer to amend her 
complaint, and so on. See King, 12 A.3d at 1151–52. 
66. As V.C. Laster succinctly put it: unlike with claims about other business decisions, with 
Caremark claims “the connection to the board is neither readily apparent nor reasonably inferable from 
the occurrence of the corporate trauma.” Baker, 62 A.3d at 23.  











later derivative suits that do not serve the best interests of shareholders. The 
recent Hughes case provides an illustration. We saw earlier that several 
commentators suggested not reading much into the Hughes decision, 
because it rested on extremely egregious facts—a rare, clear-cut case of 
utter failure of oversight. Yet such a reading of Hughes ignores the fact that 
the Southern District of New York quickly dismissed a lawsuit based on the 
exact same underlying misbehavior.67 One important factor that led to the 
different fates of the S.D.N.Y. lawsuit and the Delaware lawsuit is pre-filing 
investigations.68 The S.D.N.Y. plaintiff filed only three days after the public 
announcement of irregularities, in March 2017.69 The Delaware plaintiff, by 
contrast, prepared a thorough section 220 request and filed it in May 2017, 
and then for over a year fought the company over access to documents that 
could help to link the company’s top decision-makers to the reported 
irregularities.70 When he exhausted all his pre-filing investigation 
possibilities, the Delaware plaintiff filed in February 2019 a detailed 116-
page complaint.71 The thorough, well-documented complaint allowed the 
court to make reasonable pleading-stage inferences about what directors 
knew, when, and what they did not do to stop the pervasive problems.  
The Hughes lawsuit thus succeeded not just because of the egregious 
facts about corporate misbehavior, but also because the plaintiff did an 
important service by fully fleshing out the directors’ and executives’ role in 
not stopping such misbehavior. As the next Section shows, this is a recurring 
pattern in successful Caremark claims.  
B. Pre-Filing Investigations Determine the Fate of Caremark Claims 
Legal scholars have long attempted to identify the determinants of 
successful Caremark claims. Some focus on the type of misbehavior in 
question (cases that succeed are about disobedience rather than about taking 
bad business risks), while others focus on the type of companies in question 
(cases that succeed concern companies operating in heavily regulated 
industries).72 I propose here a different (non-exclusive) factor to focus on, 
namely, the extent to which plaintiffs and their attorneys conducted 
thorough pre-filing investigations. When outside shareholders succeed in 
 
67. Mozal & Seal, supra note 38. 
68. To be sure, this is not the only factor that matters, if only because the pleading standards in 
federal securities cases are different than those in state corporate law cases. See the 1995 Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(b), 78u-4(b)(3)(B), as interpreted in 
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314, 324 (2007). 
69. In re Kandi Techs. Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 17 Civ. 1944, 2019 WL 4918649, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2019). 
70. Hughes v. Hu, No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 WL 1987029, at *9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020).  
71. Id. at *9.  












extracting internal board communications, they exponentially increase their 
chances of finding evidence implicating scienter. To illustrate, one need 
simply look at the procedural history of Caremark cases that survived 
motions to dismiss. Most of them rested on prior section 220 litigation, 
which allowed plaintiffs to locate pleading-stage indications in one of two 
categories: (1) locating damning information that was reported to the 
directors, who ignored it; or (2) indicating a dearth of documentation of 
board-level discussion of a critical issue, which is damning in and of itself.  
The Blue Bell (Marchand) case fits the latter category, namely, dearth of 
documentation. Following the listeria outbreak, shareholders filed a section 
220 request, and combed through the company’s board minutes, observing 
that the minutes never contained a discussion of food safety issues.73 Other 
internal Blue Bell documents showed that discussions and warnings of food 
safety problems existed in house, but the information never flowed up to the 
board level.74 This was enough to convince the Supreme Court to deny the 
motion to dismiss.75 A similar theme appears in three cases involving China-
based companies that entered U.S. public markets through reverse mergers. 
In 2013, the China Agritech76 and Fuqi77 cases survived the motion to 
dismiss, based on “the glaring absence from the production of books and 
records that the Company should have readily possessed and provided.”78 
China Agritech was required in a section 220 action to produce its audit 
committee minutes and failed to produce any;79 Fuqi failed to meet 
plaintiffs’ demands for books and records and defunded its audit committee 
to prevent further investigation.80 The 2020 Hughes decision stated that 
defendants’ failure to produce exculpating documents doomed their motion 
to dismiss.81 For example, the company was ordered in prior section 220 
action to produce all the board minutes from 2009–2017 that address a 
certain thorny issue, yet the first minutes they provided were from 2014.82 
This allowed the court to infer that the board never even addressed the 
thorny issue from 2009–2014.83  
 
73. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 817 (Del. 2019). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. In re China Agritech, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 7163-VCL, 2013 WL 2181514 
(Del. Ch. May 21, 2013). 
77. Rich ex rel. Fuqi Int’l, Inc. v. Yu Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
78. China Agritech, 2013 WL 2181514, at *1. 
79. Id. at *19.  
80. Rich, 66 A.3d at 979; Kelly v. Fuqi Int’l, Inc., No. 6797-VCG, 2013 WL 1150257, at *3 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 2, 2013). 
81. See Hughes v. Hu, No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 WL 1987029, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020) 
82. Id. at *2.  
83. Id. 











Clovis represents the other category, namely, smoking-gun indications 
that red flags were flown in the directors’ face, and ignored. There, 
shareholders used section 220 to show that directors received indications 
that the company was violating FDA protocols, yet repeatedly ignored 
them.84 There was a clear mismatch between the (damning) information the 
board received in house and the (rosy) information the company disclosed 
to the public. A similar pattern emerged in the Pyott I85 case, which revolved 
around Allergan paying $600 million in fines for violating off-label drug 
marketing regulations regarding Botox. Plaintiffs obtained, via section 220, 
materials prepared for the board, allowing the court to cite specific bullet 
points from board presentations as indications that directors had to know 
about plans to ramp up Botox sales via off-label usages.86 In an earlier case, 
Saito, plaintiffs used section 220 to receive documents implicating 
directors’ awareness of fraudulent accounting schemes.87 
The upshot is clear: a shareholder who wishes to successfully plead a 
failure-of-oversight claim has to effectively utilize her inspection rights 
prior to filing. A diligent use of shareholder’s inspection rights can yield 
internal documents that link the board to the trauma, indicating that directors 
either knew about the problem but did nothing to stop it, or completely 
ignored a critical issue. Still, the question remains: why now? The fact that 
utilizing inspection rights is key to successful Caremark litigation is not 
new; Delaware courts have been telling plaintiffs that for over two decades. 
Let us move to examine what changed in recent years that made the string 
of successful Caremark claims possible. 
C. What Changed? The Liberation of Section 220  
Pre-filing investigations have become more effective in recent years. 
Some of the recent success is due to plaintiff attorneys’ learning curve and 
the Court of Chancery’s consistent admonitions to utilize section 220 prior 
to filing. Some may be attributed to the increased availability of information 
from online sources. But here I want to highlight another significant factor, 
 
84. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188, at *6 
n.76 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019). 
85. La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott (Pyott I), 46 A.3d 313 (Del. Ch. 2012).  
86. Id. at 353. The following V.C. Laster quote perfectly illustrates this Section’s argument: 
“Critically, the Complaint does not merely allege that this misconduct took place. Unlike the parade of 
hastily filed Caremark complaints that Delaware courts have dismissed, and like those rare Caremark 
complaints that prior decisions have found adequate, the Complaint supports these allegations with 
references to internal Allergan books and records that [plaintiffs] obtained using Section 220.” Id. 
87. Saito v. McCall, No. 17132-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205 (Dec. 20, 2004). For the prior 
history of the Saito case, which shows the reliance on section 220 documents, see Saito v. McKesson 












which I view as critical to the continued resurgence of Caremark litigation: 
a series of court decisions that liberalized section 220’s requirements.  
Shareholders’ right to inspect the company’s books and records is 
qualified. To gain access to internal company documents, shareholders have 
to show “proper purpose,” and even then they can request only specific 
documents that fall within the permissible scope.88 In practice, companies 
commonly do not acquiesce to shareholders’ section 220 demands: they 
refuse to provide all or part of the documents, or provide only heavily 
redacted documents.89 The demanding shareholder then often files a section 
220 action with the court, whose decision hinges on the interpretation of the 
two prongs: purpose and scope.90 In recent years, the courts have liberalized 
their interpretation of both prongs.91  
Much of the impetus for liberalizing section 220 came from a separate 
development in deal litigation, on which I elaborated elsewhere:92 decisions 
such as Corwin93 and M.F.W.94 put the onus on an informed shareholder 
vote on the deal, thereby making it necessary to allow aggrieved 
shareholders to examine ex post whether all material information was 
provided to them ex ante. The courts responded to that development by 
allowing shareholders to use section 220 to effectively plead around the 
Corwin or MFW defenses. Importantly for our purposes here, the section-
220 liberalization did not stop at deal litigation: it now accommodates 
robust pre-filing investigations also in the context of failure-of-oversight 
claims, thereby enhancing the bite of Caremark duties.  
1. Proper Purpose 
A proper purpose for inspecting the company’s books and records is one 
that is “reasonably related to such person’s interest as a stockholder.”95 
Investigating corporate wrongdoing qualifies as such.96 Yet merely 
 
88. Section 220 also contains other, more technical requirements, such as (1) being a stockholder, 
and (2) complying with formalistic requirements as to how the request has to be submitted (a written 
demand under oath). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b)–(c) (2021).  
89. Pettry v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 2020-0132-KSJM, 2020 WL 6870461, at *61 (Del. Ch. Nov. 
24, 2020). 
90. See Shapira, supra note 8. 
91. Id.  
92. Id. The two developments are intertwined. To illustrate, when the Hughes and Chou courts 
denied the motion to dismiss based on defendants’ failure to provide in prior section 220 action 
documentation of their actions, they referred to a recent notable decision in the context of deal litigation: 
Morrison v. Berry, 191 A.3d 268 (Del. 2018). See Teamsters Loc. 443 Health Servs. & Ins. Plan v. Chou, 
No. 2019-0816-SG, 2020 WL 5028065, at *24 n.314 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2020); Hughes v. Hu, No. 2019-
0112-JTL, 2020 WL 1987029, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020). 
93. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 306 (Del. 2015). 
94. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). 
95. § 220(b).  
96. Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 121 (Del. 2006).  











throwing accusations and speculations against the wall and seeing if they 
stick does not suffice. The demanding shareholder rather has to show a 
credible basis for her allegations before she gains access to internal 
documents. Instead of general allegations, the shareholder has to show some 
evidence from which the court may infer a possible breach of fiduciary 
duty.97 How much is “some,” exactly? Recent court decisions clarify that in 
our context, “some” could mean very little.  
Consider, for example, the 2019 Facebook section 220 litigation.98 When 
investigative reporters revealed the Cambridge Analytica scandal, showing 
that Facebook had been monetizing users’ data without their consent, the 
company’s stock price dropped dramatically.99 Shareholders sought to 
investigate a potential failure to monitor privacy breaches and filed a section 
220 action to inspect internal communications of Facebook’s top managers 
in the light of privacy issues.100 The company fought back, claiming that 
one cannot inspect books merely for curiosity’s sake. Shareholders’ chances 
of turning the section 220 request into a successful Caremark claim were 
slim, it argued, and it was highly unlikely that the company would benefit 
(get compensated by its directors) due to shareholders’ inspection requests. 
In other words, the defendants claimed that section 220 is available only for 
investigating actionable wrongdoing. The court insisted that while 
plaintiffs’ chances of winning a Caremark claim on the merits are indeed 
low, this, in itself, should not alter the minimal burden governing section 
220 requests.101 The court further reiterated that hearsay, such as journalistic 
reporting on the scandal, could suffice to meet the minimal, credible-basis 
standard.102  
A related, potentially more impactful clarification comes from the 2020 
AmerisourceBergen section 220 litigation.103 AmerisourceBergen is a large 
wholesale distributor of opioid pain medication, which became embroiled 
 
97. Id. at 123–25.  
98. In re Facebook, Inc. Section 220 Litig., No. 2018-0661-JRS, 2019 WL 2320842 (Del. Ch. 
May 30, 2019). 
99. Id. at *1.  
100. Specifically, Facebook was under an FTC consent decree, putting it on notice regarding how 
it treats user privacy. Id. at *2. The shareholders demanded books and records to investigate whether 
Facebook’s business model was in fact predicated on ignoring the FTC consent decree and monetizing 
user data. Id. at *1–2. The discussion throughout this Article on the resurgence of oversight duties 
corresponds with another recent debate on the ability and desirability of holding Big-Tech companies as 
“information fiduciaries.” See Andrew F. Tuch, A General Defense of Information Fiduciaries, 98 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1897, 1917 n.110 (2021).  
101. Facebook, 2019 WL 2320842, at *2.  
102. Id. at *2 n.10. 
103. Lebanon Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., No. 2019-0527-JTL, 2020 
WL 132752 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2020). Note that this is not the August 2020 case of Chou, which involved 












in regulatory investigations of the opioid crisis.104 Institutional investors 
demanded access to the company’s books and records, but the company 
denied their request in its entirety.105 In court, the company cited prior 
rulings, according to which only non-exculpated wrongdoing is proper 
purpose.106 Since the defendant directors were protected by a 102(b)(7) 
exculpatory clause, and shareholder plaintiffs could not point to particular 
indications of bad faith (because all they had at that stage was access to 
public materials), shareholders could not inspect the company’s books, or 
so the argument went.107 The Court of Chancery rejected the claim, 
clarifying that limiting inspection rights only to non-exculpated wrongdoing 
is both bad law (misunderstanding prior precedent) and bad policy 
(disincentivizing genuine efforts to hold managers accountable).108 Instead, 
the court maintained, any credible suspicion of wrongdoing at the company 
level (regardless of whether the directors were exculpated) could be deemed 
proper purpose for inspection.109  
Most recently, after the first drafts of this Article were already circulated, 
two additional decisions further cemented the liberal approach to ordering 
provision of documents pre-suit in Caremark cases. In November 2020, the 
Gilead Sciences court not only approvingly relied on AmerisourceBergen to 
grant a section 220 request on the basis of allegations from other lawsuits 
and government investigations, but also, importantly, granted leave for 
plaintiffs to move for their expenses.110 The court reasoned that the 
prevalent strategy by companies—to aggressively litigate section 220 
demands and obstruct plaintiffs from employing it as a quick and easy pre-
filing investigatory tool—calls for fee shifting.111 Then, in, December 2020, 
Delaware’s Supreme Court affirmed all the Court of Chancery’s 
determinations in AmerisourceBergen, putting a final stamp of approval on 
 
104. Id. at *1.  
105. Id. at *6.  
106. Id. at *19–23. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. Part of the court’s reasoning was that shareholders can seek to inspect their company’s 
books and records, not solely for the purpose of subsequently filing a Caremark lawsuit. They can use 
the information they receive for other purposes, such as when voting on remuneration or reelection of 
those who supposedly failed them. Id. at *11. For the assertion that prior precedent is more limited than 
the defendants argued it to be, see id. at *13–14 (citing, among others, Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Abbvie 
Inc., No. 10374-VCG, 2015 WL 1753033, at *11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 2015)). 
109. Id. at *19. 
110. Pettry v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 2020-0132-KSJM, 2020 WL 6870461, at *29–30 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 24, 2020). The case revolved around multiple alleged violations in the context of development, 
sale, and market of HIV drugs. Id. at *1.  
111. Id. at *2 & n.6 (citing James D. Cox, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, The Paradox 
of Delaware’s ‘Tools at Hand’ Doctrine: An Empirical Investigation, 75 BUS. LAW 2123 (2020)). 











the new, more liberal approach to section 220.112 Importantly, the Supreme 
Court affirmed that a demanding shareholder does not have to establish that 
the wrongdoing-in-question is actionable in order to gain access to internal 
company documents.  
The abovementioned examples join other decisions in non-Caremark 
contexts113 to signal a broader interpretation of the proper purpose 
requirement. Yet meeting the proper purpose requirement is only half the 
battle. The other half is the “permissible scope” question: what types of 
documents can a shareholder inspect in order to achieve her stated purpose? 
2. Permissible Scope 
A shareholder requesting access to internal company documents bears 
the burden of showing that each document is necessary and essential for 
meeting her stated purpose.114 “Necessary and essential” here means only 
those documents that address the crux of the purpose and contain 
information that cannot be found elsewhere. The courts have emphasized 
that shareholders cannot use section 220 as a wide-ranging fishing 
expedition, but rather need to request specific documents with “rifled 
precision.”115 Yet here as well, we are witnessing a clear trend of 
liberalization.  
Perhaps the most practically important issue in corporate litigation 
nowadays (and not just in Caremark litigation) concerns access to electronic 
forms of internal communications.116 Recent court decisions have clarified 
that electronically stored information, including emails and text messages, 
is now fair game in section 220 actions. Shareholders’ inspection rights 
apply not just to classic, hard-copy company “books and records,” such as 
board minutes, but also to informal modes of communications, such as 
emails exchanged among the company’s directors and between them and 
other company officials or third-party advisors. As long as the messages 
implicate a company issue, shareholders are entitled to inspect them, 
regardless of the medium.117 In that respect, the current trend in interpreting 
“scope” more broadly parallels the one in interpreting “purpose”: it 
facilitates robust pre-filing investigations. 
 
112. AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Lebanon Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund, 243 A.3d 417, 437 (Del. 
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114. Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 806 A.2d 113, 116 (Del. 2002). 
115. Id. at 117 n.10 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 266 (Del. 2000)). 
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To illustrate, we need simply recast our previous examples: in Facebook, 
Mark Zuckerberg and Sheryl Sandberg, among others, were ordered to 
produce emails relating to data privacy issues.118 In AmerisourceBergen, 
Vice Chancellor Laster opted for a staggered approach: first, ordering the 
provision of formal board-level materials, to allow outside shareholders to 
get a sense of what materials directors formally received and considered.119 
Then, pertinently, he allowed shareholders to depose directors and 
potentially extend the scope of inspection further, to less formal materials 
that would evidence directors’ deliberations and knowledge, such as emails 
and other electronic messages with the company’s officials.120  
It is hard to overstate the importance of expanding the scope of section 
220 to informal, electronic communications.121 Formal documents such as 
board minutes are usually drafted after the fact, by paper-trail-generating 
lawyers. Informal electronic communications in social media and emails are 
done in real time and are usually less carefully edited. Applied to oversight 
liability litigation, such extended scope increases plaintiffs’ chances of 
finding smoking-gun indications of red flags that were flown in the 
directors’ faces. 
Beyond illustrating the liberalization of section 220, Facebook and 
AmerisourceBergen also suggest that when debating whether there is a “new 
Caremark era” or not, we should look beyond the Blue Bell-Clovis-Hughes-
Chou quadfecta. When we evaluate the trend, we should also factor in 
successful section 220 actions filed in preparation for potential subsequent 
Caremark litigation. Much like successful merit-based Caremark litigation, 
successful section 220 litigation often imposes costs on defendants in ways 
that make them internalize the costs of failures of oversight. A successful 
section 220 not only increases the expected legal sanction down the road. It 
also, pertinently, imposes non-legal costs, such as the emotional drainage of 
going through depositions (as in AmerisourceBergen) or the reputational 
damage that comes from media coverage of the section 220 dispute (as in 
Facebook).122 In other words, section 220 litigation over investigation of 
potential failures of oversight can yield similar consequences to actual 
Caremark litigation.  
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119. Lebanon Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., No. 2019-0527-JTL, 2020 
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D. Other Causes Besides the Rise of Shareholder Inspection Rights  
Thus far we have seen that the new Caremark era consists of enhanced 
duties for overseeing critical regulatory risks (as in Marchand, Clovis, and 
Chou), and lower evidentiary thresholds for requesting internal documents 
and allowing for provision of even formal e-communications (as in 
Facebook and AmerisourceBergen). Before we switch to evaluating the 
desirability of such developments in Part III below, let us dedicate this 
Section to discussing other potential drivers of the resurgence of oversight 
duties, besides the increased emphasis on pre-filing investigations.  
Indeed, the recent liberalization of section 220 cannot fully explain the 
wave of successful Caremark cases. Recall that in Blue Bell and in Hughes, 
for example, the court denied the motion to dismiss not based on documents 
extracted via section 220, but rather based on the documents that were not 
provided.123 And in Clovis and Chou, most of the pleading-stage inferences 
about red flags were made using board-level documents: the type of 
traditional documents that were long available via section 220, rather than 
the type of smoking-gun emails that have recently won claims in the deal 
negotiation context.124 One could therefore claim that regardless of how the 
courts now interpret the permissible scope of inspection rights, these 
Caremark claims could have succeeded even under a more stringent 
interpretation that does not allow the production of informal 
communications. 
It is thus important to reiterate: I do not claim that the expansion of the 
permissible scope prong of section 220 is the sole driver of the new 
Caremark era. My claim is rather broader and more modest: the increased 
emphasis on pre-filing investigations increases the chances that a Caremark 
claim will survive the motion to dismiss. The courts’ constant admonitions 
and tinkering started paying dividends, in that plaintiffs now increasingly 
turn to and make better use of their inspection rights.125 And once the 
plaintiff fully utilizes her inspection rights and submits a detailed complaint, 
the court is more willing to draw inferences against the defendants, such as 
holding lack of documentation against them, as an indication for ignoring 
red flags.126 In all, Delaware corporate law has become more pre-filing-
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investigations friendly, which bodes well for plaintiffs’ chances in 
Caremark cases. 
To further clarify, I do not see my section-220 explanation as the sole 
driver of the resurgence in oversight duties. The new Caremark era is not 
only about better pre-filing investigations. There exist other, non-mutually-
exclusive drivers. One potential driver is what Gadinis and Miazad recently 
referred to as “the hidden power” of compliance officers.127 The 
proliferation of compliance personnel within organizations, and the credible 
threat of liability that they face, have gradually increased the chances that 
these compliance officers will report to the board on thorny aspects of the 
company’s compliance. This, in turn, increases the chances of locating red 
flags after the fact and holding directors accountable for ignoring them in 
real time. In other words, nowadays there exists more robust evidentiary 
records on compliance issues within organizations, which in turn opens a 
clearer path for director liability.128  
Another potential driver of the resurgence of director oversight duties is 
the increased societal demands that corporations face these days, calling on 
them to treat their stakeholders and society at large better. Former Chief 
Justice Strine has recently alluded to how these rising “ESG” demands 
coincide with Caremark duties.129 There exist two conduits from rising 
societal demands to a recalibration of Delaware corporate law (here, 
oversight duties). First, the courts may believe that the environment that 
corporations operate in these days necessitates that directors devote more 
time and effort to monitor compliance risks, if only because the expected 
regulatory and reputational sanctions for ignoring compliance have grown. 
In other words, the argument could be that an increased emphasis on 
oversight is more and more in the best interests of shareholders. Indeed, a 
similar reasoning was the impetus for the 1996 Caremark decision, where 
Chancellor Allen noted that the then-recently-passed sentencing guidelines 
have made the oversight role of the board all the more important.130 A 
second conduit from rising societal and regulatory demands to a change in 
corporate law doctrine is Delaware courts’ need to maintain legitimacy and 
stem federal intervention.131 Others have made a similar argument—
namely, that Delaware courts are attuned to potential public backlashes over 
salient corporate governance problems—in the past, such as in early 2000s, 
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when public attention was focused on excessive executive pay and 
Delaware handed down its famous Disney decision.132 
Whatever the other drivers of the recent trend in oversight duties are, the 
expansion of shareholders’ inspection rights is likely to ensure that the trend 
is here to stay. If we think that more indications of red flags exist in house 
these days, or that courts are more willing to scrutinize failure of oversight, 
then arming plaintiffs and their attorneys with better pre-filing investigatory 
tools is bound to lead to more successful Caremark claims in the near future. 
The question then becomes: is that a good thing?  
III. CONSEQUENCES: FACILITATING BETTER INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
ENFORCEMENT 
It is one thing to recognize that more Caremark claims survive the 
motion to dismiss these days, and another to conclude that such a 
development is desirable from a societal perspective. For one, we saw that 
some of the development in oversight duties is related to the expansion of 
pre-filing discovery. And the expansion of pre-filing discovery comes with 
its own set of thorny issues. Section 220 actions consume sizeable resources 
of the demanding shareholder, the company, and the courts.133 Beyond the 
direct costs, expanded section 220 actions also carry the risk of a chilling 
effect by subjecting companies to “excessive and disruptive, and perhaps 
nefarious, inquiries.”134 One could also question the benefits arising from 
the new Caremark cases: success in section 220 actions or motions to 
dismiss does not mean that these cases will ultimately be decided in favor 
of the plaintiffs. We therefore cannot jump to the conclusion that these new 
cases would generate better deterrence—or so the argument goes.  
In fact, such an objection misconstrues how Delaware corporate law 
works (deters). In corporate law, in general, corporate decision-makers 
practically never pay out of pocket for their misbehavior.135 Yet deterrence 
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cannot be measured solely on the basis of sanctions imposed in verdicts 
coming after a full trial. Deterrence here rather comes from paying 
settlements ex post and planning how to avoid the risks and costs of 
litigation ex ante.  
Part of the law’s effect on behavior comes from the memos that legal 
advisors send their clients, explaining how they should behave going 
forward. As Section A details, the new Caremark cases created a wave of 
law firm memos calling on boards to place compliance issues on the agenda 
and make sure deliberations are being properly recorded. Another part of 
the law’s effect on behavior is through imposing (uninsurable) non-legal 
costs, such as the emotional costs (stress, embarrassment) and the 
reputational costs (having details about your misbehavior dug out and made 
public, for all other market participants to see).136 Section B illustrates how 
the expansion of section 220 has dramatically increased these non-legal 
costs for failure of oversight, thereby ramping up deterrence. At the same 
time, I should not overstate my claim: even in the most optimistic reading 
of the new Caremark era, private, corporate-law litigation plays only a small 
part in the larger compliance puzzle, and it cannot fix all the major 
problems. Accordingly, Section C clarifies my more modest claim: the 
revamped, section 220-driven mode of Caremark litigation, however 
imperfect, balances some of the flaws of the other institutions that combat 
corporate illegality.  
A. Facilitating Better Paper Trails  
After each of the abovementioned new Caremark decisions, the large 
law firms sent memos to their clients, imploring directors to (1) start 
working harder on implementing and conducting periodic reviews of a well-
integrated legal compliance program, and (2) make sure that proper 
documentation exists and that the board minutes demonstrate that the board 
received appropriate information about the key issues the company faces.137 
For example, following Marchand, law firms advised boards to “establish 
systems so that management provides them with an adequate picture of 
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compliance risks.”138 Following Hughes, law firms highlighted the fact that 
the court would draw “plaintiff-friendly, pleadings-stage inferences . . . 
based on what was—and more importantly, what was not—included in the 
corporate board minutes regarding the topics in dispute,”139 and accordingly 
concluded that boards should strive to keep more robust documentation of 
board discussions and company records.140 In fact, legal advisors are now 
using the new Caremark cases to admonish their clients to create better 
reporting systems and documentation not just in the context of monitoring 
illegalities, but also in the context of monitoring the company’s response to 
COVID-19-related challenges, or to cybersecurity threats.141  
The key question is whether such an increased emphasis on record-
keeping would contribute to reducing the social costs of corporate 
misbehavior. The answer depends on the extent to which better paper trails 
produce real salutary effects. A skeptic may argue that a company can have 
fantastic paper trails merely as window dressing, without actual 
improvement in the underlying behavior. Yet from this vantage point, 
focusing on a well-documented process is a staple of corporate law and is 
also good policy. Research on decision-making shows that robust 
documentation can generate real positive effects, such as assuring an issue 
is not neglected, or elevating the level of deliberation.142  
Specifically in the context of oversight, academic studies on how to 
better evaluate the effectiveness of compliance programs suggest focusing 
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on what “kinds of data that managers should be collecting to demonstrate 
that their compliance program is not a mere ‘paper’ program.”143 This, in a 
nutshell, is what the new Caremark era is all about: investigating and 
evaluating whether managers collected the right amount and type of data so 
that their compliance program is not merely cosmetic. Sure, directors and 
their advisors may be driven by the desire to make the board materials more 
litigation-proof; but in the process, they nevertheless put compliance on the 
board agenda and facilitate upward flows of information in the 
organization.144  
The emphasis on better record-keeping can also help investigators 
determine after the fact who knew what when, mitigating the difficulty in 
holding individuals responsible (that is, mitigating plausible deniability).145 
And the threat of having traces of your shenanigans exposed after the fact 
may deter you from engaging in shenanigans in the first place.146  
B. Facilitating Reputational Discipline  
A Caremark lawsuit based on thorough pre-filing investigations 
produces quality information on companies’ ability and intentions to follow 
legal and market norms. To the extent that such information becomes 
public, it generates a positive externality: helping third parties to decide 
whether they want to keep doing business with the defendant 
company/businessperson or not. The new mode of Caremark litigation may 
therefore hold the promise of shaping compliance not just directly, through 
the threat of legal sanctions, but also indirectly, through the threat of 
reputational sanctions.  
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1. Reputation through Litigation: A Short Primer147  
When bad news about a company breaks, the company’s stakeholders 
may update their beliefs, inferring that the company’s “type” is worse than 
they realized, and reduce their willingness to do business with the company 
going forward. The aggregate of diminished business opportunities 
constitutes the reputational sanction for violating market norms. The size of 
the reputational sanction—how many future business opporunities will be 
lost—is a function of several conditions. For reputational sanctions to be 
meaningful, it is not enough that damning information will be revealed. The 
information has to be widely diffused so as to reach a critical mass of 
stakeholders; it has to be perceived by the stakeholders as credible, and it 
has to be attributed by the stakeholders to deep-seated problems in the 
company that are likely to resurface in the future.  
In previous projects I showed that litigation affects reputational discpline 
in each of the abovementioned aspects of reputational sanctions: revelation, 
attribution, certification, and diffusion of information.148 Litigation, 
especially American-style, vests fact-finding powers in private litigants to 
extract relevant information from their rivals, and may therefore provide 
market players who follow litigation with information to which they 
previously could not have been privy.149 The information coming from 
litigation can particularly affect stakeholders’ attribution: by unearthing 
inside information about what and when top management knew about the 
problem, litigation can help stakeholders decide whether the problem is a 
one-off, honest mistake, or rather indicative of deep-seated flaws that are 
likely to resurface in the future.150 Information coming from the courthouse 
is also usually perceived as credible. And litigation affects the frequency 
and tenor of media coverage of the issue at hand. It provides journalists with 
so-called “information subsidies” in the form of pre-packaged, well-
documented, libel-proof bits of information about a newsworthy issue.151 
Indeed, information coming from litigation is perhaps the most important 
source of information for successful investigative reporting nowadays.152  
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2. Reputation through Caremark Litigation  
The abovementioned reputation-through-litigation dynamics are in full 
display in the new version of Caremark litigation. Until the last decade, 
Caremark litigation offered very little in terms of relevant information: 
since most Caremark claims piggybacked on the efforts of regulatory 
enforcement and were dismissed at the pleading stage,153 they did not 
provide market players with information they were not already privy to. 
Nowadays, by contrast, outside shareholders and their attorneys are 
investigating before filing, and with the help of section 220 they are 
producing internal company documents to which the market was not 
privy.154 Further, the section 220 litigation in itself allows Delaware judges 
opportunities to comment on the underlying behavior.155 In that way, the 
new section 220-driven Caremark litigation may spur media scrutiny of the 
companies and businesspersons involved, thereby facilitating reputational 
discipline.  
To illustrate, let us recast two recent examples: The Blue Bell and 
Facebook cases.156 In Blue Bell’s listeria outbreak case, section 220 did not 
just increase the chances that the defendants would suffer legal sanctions 
for their alleged failure of oversight; it also had an immediate, significant 
impact on the defendants’ reputation. For a food company, a food-safety 
crisis with three deaths is a high reputational risk. Yet the company initially 
seemed to be doing a good job containing the risk, by managing public 
perception in the wake of the crisis.157 As one academic study showed, Blue 
Bell initially managed to control how the event was framed in the media, 
thereby curtailing the initial reputational fallout.158 And indeed, soon after 
the bad news broke in 2015, Blue Bell was already back to being the fifth 
leading manufacturer in the U.S. in 2016.159 
Then, plaintiffs filed a section 220 action, which altered how the media 
covered the event. By culling numerous internal documents, shareholders 
were able to show that the board ignored issues of food safety. Justice 
Strine’s lucid comments at the pleading stage were quickly picked up by the 
media, which then went back to covering the listeria debacle and changed 
its tune, this time highlighting Blue Bell’s systemic disregard for food 
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safety.160 The pre-filing investigations and subsequent Caremark litigation 
turned into a source of media scrutiny and, by extension, a huge reputational 
risk for Blue Bell. 
Another vivid case in point comes from Facebook’s section 220 
litigation. After investigative reporters initially broke the Cambridge 
Analytica story in 2018, Facebook and its CEO Mark Zuckerberg went on 
a public campaign to limit the reputational fallout, communicating a 
newfound commitment to user privacy.161 Then, shareholders who wished 
to investigate failure of oversight by Facebook’s board and top executives 
filed a section 220 action, which brought with it negative media coverage: 
major business media outlets and tech blogs went back to emphasizing 
Facebook’s apparent “scant regard for users’ privacy.”162 Here as well, the 
section 220 litigation shaped the saliency and tenor of media coverage.  
Caremark-type investigations yield information that is highly 
“reputation-relevant.” The emphasis on finding bad faith indications 
translates into unearthing information on who knew what when – 
information that is considered in the reputation literature as highly 
indicative of the company’s future behavior. Such bad faith indications can 
therefore be determinative of stakeholders’ decisions to continue doing 
business with the company or not, that is, determinative of the size of the 
reputational fallout.163 To be sure, Caremark-type investigations usually do 
not generate much new information on the alleged underlying corporate 
misbehavior (such as price-fixing, bribing, or polluting). After all, a 
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Caremark claim is usually filed after the bad news about the underlying 
misbehavior has broken, and after regulatory investigations have already 
generated information on said misbehavior. Caremark’s reputational fallout 
comes rather from its impact on how stakeholders perceive the company’s 
commitment to integrity and a system of internal checks and balances.  
Caremark-type investigations also facilitate a more robust market for 
reputation by separating company- from industry-level reputation. The 
point can best be illustrated by recasting AmerisourceBergen: there, 
defendants claimed that the ongoing opioid investigation could not be 
considered an evidentiary basis justifying a section 220 inspection, because 
the regulatory investigation was directed at the opioid industry as a whole.164 
The court rebutted that “everyone else is doing it” is not a valid argument, 
and allowed inspection.165 From a reputational perspective, such company-
level investigations are extremely valuable: when regulators target whole 
industries for certain prevalent misconduct, it may be good for legal 
enforcement numbers, but it does not affect reputations much.166 The reason 
is that stakeholders of company X cannot punish the company for 
misbehaving if all of the company’s competitors face similar allegations 
(they cannot take their business elsewhere).167 Private Caremark litigation 
helps in ferreting out who among the industry players fared worse. It allows 
the media, NGOs, and regulators to scrutinize conduct not at the abstract 
level of entire industries but rather at the concrete level of individual 
companies and businesspersons.  
Further, the new Caremark era affects not just the reputations of specific 
market players but also the market norms. A key function of Delaware 
corporate law has always been to facilitate non-legal sanctions. Rather than 
directly interfere with directors’ decisions and impose legal sanctions, 
Delaware judges produce richly detailed narratives of good and bad 
corporate behavior.168 Once the morality tales of corporate saints and 
sinners become publicly available, they unleash all sorts of non-legal forces. 
In one version, directors hate to be dressed down in verdicts because it 
lowers the esteem in which they are held by colleagues and peers (external 
moral sanctions).169 In another version, directors who are subjected to 
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judicial scolding suffer not so much from the disesteem of others as from 
their own sense of guilt (internal moral sanctions).170 In yet another version, 
judicial scolding reduces third parties’ willingness to do business with the 
defendant directors or company (reputational sanctions).171 Yet in the “old” 
mode of Caremark litigation, there were hardly opportunities for Delaware 
courts to evaluate and opine on directors’ oversight conduct.172  
The “new,” section-220-driven version of Caremark litigation brings 
back to life the abovementioned non-legal effects. Section 220 actions and 
subsequent merit-based litigation give judges the opportunity to provide 
their version of what and how things happened (thereby affecting 
reputation), or how things ought to have happened (thereby affecting 
business norms).173 The media often views such judicial commentary as 
noteworthy—recall the media coverage of Chief Justice Strine’s colorful 
criticism of Blue Bell.174 The rise of section 220 may therefore restore not 
just direct deterrence but also indirect deterrence, by facilitating Delaware’s 
ability to shape norms and reputations in the business community.175 
C. Balancing the Flaws of Regulatory Enforcement and Internal 
Compliance  
I should be careful not to overstate my claim here: perhaps thus far I have 
sung too zealously the praises of the new Caremark era. But in reality, even 
on the most optimistic reading of recent cases, shareholder litigation 
probably remains only one small part of the larger corporate compliance 
puzzle. For various reasons, shareholder litigation is incapable of solving 
all the major problems on its own.176 My point here is therefore more 
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modest: the new version of Caremark litigation may be imperfect, but its 
flaws are imperfectly correlated with the other mechanisms for holding 
companies accountable, such as regulatory enforcement or internal 
compliance efforts. In other words, the new Caremark litigation holds the 
promise of checking and balancing other enforcement institutions—a 
“diversified portfolio” approach for enforcement.  
1. Problems with Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance  
Various regulators are tasked with detecting and punishing corporate 
misbehavior. Yet regulatory enforcement177 suffers from several well-
documented flaws.178 For one, the probability of detecting corporate 
wrongdoing is small. Regulators face scarce enforcement resources, and 
when the regulated entities are large organizations with high levels of 
complexity, detection becomes extremely difficult.179  
Even when regulatory enforcers detect corporate wrongdoing, they 
rarely succeed in charging top-level decision-makers.180 Proving intent and 
knowledge of individuals is hard given how information is diffused within 
these large organizations. Top executives, in particular, can insulate 
themselves from “toxic” information, pushing responsibility for operational 
decisions down the organizational ladder, while drawing credit for 
successes up the ladder.181  
And even when regulatory enforcers are successful in detecting and 
charging corporate wrongdoing, they fail to effectively target corporate 
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recidivism. Here the problem stems from the fact that regulatory 
enforcement is disparate and uncoordinated, as each enforcer has a narrow, 
circumscribed authority.182 As a result, the government has “largely failed 
to sanction corporate repeat offenders as recidivists.”183  
Finally, regulatory enforcement tends to underproduce information on 
corporate wrongdoing. Corporate criminal enforcement shifted from an 
emphasis on full trials and convictions to an emphasis on deferred- and non-
prosecution agreements (DPAs and NPAs, respectively).184 Civil 
enforcement by the SEC similarly moved from fighting in courts to filing 
administratively and settling quickly.185 An oft-mentioned criticism is that 
such enforcement through negotiation is too lenient. Yet the common 
criticism misses the mark: the DOJ or the SEC rarely leaves money on the 
table; the problem is that they leave information on the table.186 The 
misbehaving companies agree to settle quickly and pay nicely, and so the 
regulators can boast of an increase in total fines collected.187 In exchange, 
companies get to limit and control the release of damning information about 
them to the market. For example, the SEC reportedly allows companies to 
negotiate the language of the regulator’s press release.188  
All these problems with regulatory enforcement have led to an increased 
emphasis on internal compliance. Various legal programs now either 
directly require or indirectly incentivize companies to implement 
compliance programs.189 To receive such regulatory credit, the compliance 
programs must be considered “effective.”190 Yet measuring effectiveness is 
hard even for the companies themselves, to say nothing of external 
regulators.191 And until recently, corporate law did not exactly incentivize 
directors to innovate and invest in meaningful compliance: as long as they 
had some compliance features, the complaint against them would be readily 
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dismissed.192 As a result, too many programs deteriorated into cosmetic 
compliance—paper programs that seemed fine from the outside but in 
reality did very little to prevent and detect corporate misbehavior.193 In other 
words, these programs functioned merely as window dressing meant to 
reduce expected legal and reputational sanctions.194 
There exists a consensus that one of the biggest challenges in internal 
compliance is to “make sure that relevant information on breaches of the 
law make[s] it to the top decision makers.”195 Large organizations usually 
suffer from information silos.196 Even when a company has well-staffed and 
well-budgeted compliance programs and structures in place, information 
does not necessarily flow upwards. Damning information may exist inside 
the organization, but the organization fails to follow through on it. The 
Wells Fargo phony-accounts scandal is a case in point: several internal 
company reviews flagged the problematic practices, but the information was 
too scattered in separate business units.197  
Relatedly, regulators and academics have expressed worries about how 
the tone at the top of a company does not reflect a true commitment to 
compliance.198 For compliance to be effective, it is not enough that top 
managers stay apprised of the company’s program; they also need to clearly 
communicate their alignment with the social goals that the program is 
supposed to advance. The GM faulty ignition switch scandal is a case in 
point: while the company had a good compliance program and procedures 
on paper, the tone from the top leadership emphasized controlling costs at 
all costs, eventually leading to the mass-scale scandal.199 Part of the problem 
may stem from managers’ own incentives: managers and directors who 
receive substantial stock-based compensation have incentives to stint on 
compliance.200 The market does not adequately reward investment in 
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compliance, and managers are incentivized to underreport problems for fear 
of a negative overreaction by investors.201 
2. How the New Caremark Era Can Mitigate These Problems  
Caremark litigation, even in its best version, cannot mitigate all the 
problems associated with regulatory enforcement or internal compliance. 
For one, private litigation rests on the incentives of outside shareholders and 
their attorneys, who may not want to discipline corporate disobedience 
when such disobedience actually benefits them at the expense of society 
(think for example about pollution that goes under-punished due to 
regulatory constraints/capture).202 Further, even when shareholders and 
their attorneys wish to enforce compliance, they may not be particularly 
adept at fixing the low probability of detection problem. That is, they are 
less likely to be the ones detecting misbehavior (this would be left to 
whistleblowers, investigative reporters, short sellers, and so on.)203 There 
are, nevertheless, important areas where Caremark litigation, in its 
revamped form, checks and balances the other systems’ flaws. Consider for 
example how the new Caremark era can combat three problems of public 
enforcement: lack of individual accountability, recidivism, and information 
underproduction.  
Promoting individual accountability. Focusing criminal enforcement on 
top decision-makers is hard and can also backfire by discouraging top 
decision-makers from becoming aware of problems inside their 
organizations.204 Caremark litigation balances this tendency by probing the 
involvement of top-level corporate decision-makers: if these individuals 
deliberately avoided damning information to create plausible deniability, 
such as by keeping discussions of thorny issues off the board agenda, the 
court may now use it against them as failure of oversight. Caremark 
litigation also helps in checking the tone at the top. Without litigation, it is 
hard to tell whether top managers set the right compliance tone, as their 
messages are usually “sanitized . . . by the time they become publicly 
available.”205 Yet the expanded version of section 220 now allows plaintiffs 
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and their attorneys to inspect live and unsanitized electronic 
communications, thereby making it easier to expose the true tone.206 
Further, we saw how the new Caremark cases led legal advisers and their 
clients to rethink and refine their record-keeping. Such newfound emphasis 
on record-keeping can combat the problems of information silos and upward 
flows of information. When directors are told to create a proper record of 
efforts to address the issue, it forces them to ask others in the organization 
to prepare materials for them, which in turn brings thorny issues to the fore. 
And as Section III.A noted, a better paper trail can help investigators 
identify culpable top-level individuals after the fact, forcing directors to take 
ownership of certain aspects of corporate behavior.207  
Fighting recidivism. When a company has a record of continuing non-
compliance, the courts are more willing to let failure-of-oversight claims 
proceed.208 To illustrate, contrast the pre-Caremark era Allis-Chalmers case 
with the new-Caremark era Facebook case. The cases share similar factual 
background: both companies were caught violating consent decrees with the 
FTC (over price-fixing and user privacy, respectively).209 Yet while in the 
Allis-Chalmers era directors were let off the hook, today directors and 
executives of companies under consent decrees are bound to heightened 
oversight duties. Similarly, in AmerisourceBergen, the court made a point 
of providing plaintiffs with access to documents concerning past regulatory 
settlements, even though these settlements happened long before the 
relevant timeframe for the issue at hand.210 The court reasoned that looking 
into defendants’ past conduct could be useful as an indication of how they 
tried to game the system by slowly backing away from compliance over 
time.211 In that sense, the new Caremark litigation contributes to fighting 
those who systematically attempt to evade the law. The doctrine’s emphasis 
on directors’ mental state, coupled with potent investigatory tools, may be 
the best antidote to evasion efforts.212  
Fighting information underproduction. Regulatory enforcement often 
underproduces relevant information. In criminal enforcement, DPAs and 
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NPAs order specific companies to improve their behavior going forward, 
and often also appoint a monitor to oversee the purported improvement, but 
they do not provide general guidance to other firms on how to handle similar 
issues.213 In civil enforcement, regulators such as the SEC maximize the 
amount of enforcement actions started and fines collected. This often makes 
them prioritize minor, strict liability-type offenses, and neither-admit-nor-
deny settlements that do not help the market distinguish between good and 
not-so-good market players.214 The “old” version of Caremark litigation, 
where fast-filed complaints were quickly dismissed, produced very little 
relevant information not already available to the market from regulatory 
enforcement. Today, by contrast, plaintiffs extract more relevant inside 
information, and Delaware judges get more opportunities to provide 
guidance. Recall, for example, the flurry of legal advice that followed Blue 
Bell’s and Clovis’ discussion of oversight in the “monoline companies” 
context.215  
As of the writing of this Article, a strong case in point is in the making: 
an institutional investor filed another section 220 action against Facebook, 
seeking to inspect whether Facebook opted to pay a bigger fine to the FTC 
in exchange for limiting Mark Zuckerberg’s personal liability.216 This is 
exactly how section 220 actions, if meritorious, can help curb agency costs 
and check regulators’ behavior.  
* * * 
In all, there is ample reason to like the new developments in oversight 
liability litigation. Policymakers attempt to curb corporate illegality through 
myriad channels, from criminal prosecutions, to encouraging the 
implementation of internal compliance systems, to enlisting the help of 
private enforcers such as plaintiff lawyers. Each mechanism suffers from 
serious flaws, and corporate fiduciary duty litigation is hardly different.217 
Yet instead of overly theorizing how each mechanism works in isolation, 
we should attempt to capture the interactions— that is, understand how the 
systems work in tandem. What matters is whether each mechanism’s 
advantages can balance the other mechanisms’ blind spots or not. This Part 
provided indications that the recent trend in Caremark litigation represents 
a step in the right direction in that respect. While I cannot provide an exact 
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cost-benefit estimation (that is ultimately a matter for future empirical 
research), I can point to several reasons to prima facie favor the trend of 
enhanced oversight duties we are currently witnessing. For one, unlike other 
areas of corporate behavior, such as classic business decisions, here the 
costs of court errors are lower, given the high “normative clarity.” There is 
a roughly-standardized measure of whether companies violated regulations 
or not, and so the societal costs of court errors in imposing liability are 
smaller relative to other areas such as scrutinizing business decisions.218 
One final clarification before we conclude: while this Article has largely 
sung the praise of the new Caremark era, it should not be read as a paean to 
Delaware corporate law in general. Rather, I am advancing here a claim of 
how Delaware corporate law functions when it is at its best. In the past, 
Caremark litigation may have reflected the too-deferential-to-managers 
version of Delaware corporate law. In its revamped mode, by contrast, 
Caremark litigation rests on an ecosystem of expert judges effectively 
micro-managing the process. Judges stagger the costs of (targeted, pre-
filing) discovery, as a function of the information asymmetries and the 
credibility of the allegations at hand. They make sure that bounty hunters 
(activist shareholders or plaintiff attorneys) get their bounty only when they 
contribute to shareholders as a group.219 And when the system works that 
way, it generates a positive externality of quality information on corporate 
behavior, which facilitates a robust market for reputation.220  
CONCLUSION 
Compliance has become a key corporate governance issue. With 
renewed societal concerns “about whether business entities conduct 
themselves in a manner that is consistent with society’s best interests,”221 
mounting regulatory requirements, and hundreds of billions spent on 
internal programs, it is crucial to get corporate compliance right. Yet until 
recently, corporate law played only a limited role in holding directors 
accountable for compliance failures. And, among many scholars, corporate 
anti-social behavior was seen as a matter for other laws and regulations, 
rather than an internal corporate law issue. This state of affairs seems to be 
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changing fast, with a string of successful Caremark claims signaling 
enhanced oversight duties. 
This Article has contributed to our understanding of the change in 
director oversight duties along the following three dimensions. First, the 
Article has delineated the contours of the “new Caremark era”, identifying 
certain themes and trends such as increased willingness to activate an 
enhanced oversight duties mode and increased willingness to allow outside 
shareholders access to internal corporate documents to meet the once-
insuperable pleading hurdle. Second, the Article has located several drivers 
of the resurgence of oversight duties, emphasizing a seemingly tangential 
development in shareholders’ right to information. Finally, the Article has 
offered reasons to believe that the new development would prove desirable 
from a societal perspective: it facilitates upward flows of information inside 
large organizations, contributes to the ability of the market to discipline 
misbehaving companies, and balances the blind spots of other enforcement 
mechanisms. From this vantage point, the new mode of Caremark litigation 
seems to be striking the right balance between deference to business 
decisions and accountability for failure of oversight.  
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